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This paper documents the socio-economic status 
of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville and 
the extent of rebound in investment and access 
to services since the cessation of conflict there in 
1997. Data on the level of income, the age profile of 
the population, the level of access to basic services, 
and levels of investment in residential housing 
were collected via a household-level survey that 
was administered in the four major urban centres. 
Analysis of these data shows that per capita income 
has rebounded to 40 per cent of the pre-conflict 
level; approximately half of the population is 
aged less than 20 years; and one-third of school-
age children are not attending school. These 
observations have value in assessing the extent of 
economic recovery following the installation of 
peace and the levels of public investment required 
for improving access to basic services.
Introduction
Bougainville has remained peaceful for a dozen 
years. Peace was negotiated following a decade-long 
war that is estimated to have caused approximately 
2,000 deaths and possibly ten times as many more 
due to lack of services (Braithwaite et al. 2010). 
The then province of Papua New Guinea fell from 
its top rank to the bottom in terms of per capita 
income and other social indicators of development 
among the 19 provinces. The impact of the conflict 
lives on in the form of ‘cooked’ (burnt) and ruined 
infrastructure, and a ‘lost generation’ comprising 
those who missed out on schooling and basic 
health care during the conflict. Here I use data 
collected through a purpose-designed household 
survey that was administered in February 2011 
to show that incomes and access to services are 
recovering but are yet to reach pre-crisis levels.
Wars cause growth collapses with immense 
human suffering and this is no less true of civil 
conflicts. One estimate shows that intra-state wars 
have caused three times as many deaths as inter-
state wars since World War II (Fearon and Laitin 
2003). Furthermore, post-conflict peace has proved 
to be fragile, with nearly one-half of civil wars 
due to post-conflict relapses (Collier et al. 2008). 
Research on the causes of intra-state war and what 
to do about ending them is in its infancy. Most of 
the studies draw on cross-country analysis and in 
the main from sub-Saharan Africa. Such analysis, 
while informative, misses out on the nuances of 
the particular context. The lack of detailed micro-
empirical analyses including detailed case studies 
is due to the absence of requisite data (Abadie and 
Gardeazabal 2003). This paper demonstrates how 
socio-economic data may be collected in a post-
conflict environment and the use such information 
may be put to.
The economic drivers of conflict and the 
extent to which a rebound in the economy could 
help cement peace remains an open question. 
There is a view that economic factors trump social 
and institutional characteristics in explaining the 
incidence of civil conflict, even though the causal 
factors at work remain in dispute. Economists, for 
example, explain the robust negative relationship 
between levels of per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) and the onset and duration of conflicts as 
evidence supporting the proposition that conflicts 
prevail when the opportunity costs of war are low 
compared to substitute activities such as farming 
(Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Miguel et al. (2004) 
lend evidential support to the proposition that 
declines in the rate of economic growth cause 
conflicts, by using rainfall data 
from sub-Saharan Africa to show 
that negative exogenous shocks to 
income increase the likelihood of 
civil conflict. They estimate that 
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‘a one per centage point decline in GDP increases 
the likelihood of civil conflict by over two per 
centage points’ (ibid:740). Political scientists, while 
acknowledging the negative correlation between 
income and conflict, question the causal links: 
Fearon and Laitin (2003), for example, argue that 
limited repressive capacities of the state due to low 
national income explain the observed negative 
correlation between per capita GDP and conflict. 
Rationalist explanations that wars prevail when 
feasible encompass both of the above arguments 
(Collier et al. 2009).
Cross-country studies, while useful in identify-
ing broad regularities in the data, are insufficient to 
inform policy formulation in a particular context. 
This is because the nature of conflicts is likely to be 
‘radically different’ in different countries (Abadie 
and Gardeazabal 2003). The nuances of individual 
conflicts demand detailed case studies to inform 
policymaking on the ground, which in turn require 
micro-economic data. However, reliable timely 
data at the household level is generally absent in 
most post-conflict environments. The collection 
and storage of data is a common casualty in a con-
flict: both from omission and commission. On the 
former, resources expended in the collection and 
storage of data are often withdrawn as fiscal pres-
sures build in the lead-up to war. On the latter, 
expropriation of property often involves purpose-
ful destruction of records (Braithwaite et al. 2010). 
Consequently, policymaking in the aftermath of 
war suffers from lack of information.
In the case of Bougainville, its turbulent past 
illustrates the disruptive potential of uneven growth 
— between enclave mining and the rest of the 
economy. A referendum for independence is due to 
be held between 2015 and 2020 as agreed to under 
the peace agreement signed on 30 August 2001 
(GoPNG 2001). The past of a vibrant economy 
built on cocoa, copra and mining was destroyed 
during the decade-long war with concomitant 
collapse in socio-economic indicators. The above 
has lessons for a future Bougainville. Whether as 
an independent nation or as a peacefully integrated 
region of Papua New Guinea, broad-based 
economic recovery and widespread access to basic 
services and jobs will be critical to sustaining peace 
for the foreseeable future. Critical to creating the 
conditions for broad-based growth and widespread 
access to services is effective policymaking, for 
which timely data is a prerequisite. The requisite 
data is largely absent.
Collecting data in a post-conflict environment 
is difficult. The major challenges include ensuring 
the safety of the researchers during fieldwork, 
maintaining quality of the collected data, and 
garnering the resources for fieldwork. The case of 
post-conflict Bougainville is used to demonstrate 
how data to gauge the extent of economic recovery 
may be collected and then used to inform 
policymaking. A household-level survey of four 
urban centres was used to provide a snapshot of 
the levels of income, population and access to basic 
services. Data on levels of schooling and the age 
(and type) of residences was used to reconstruct a 
time profile on accessibility to basic services and 
the conditions for investment during the crisis. This 
cross-sectional information was combined with 
data on cocoa exports to create a time profile of 
income during the conflict.
This paper is structured as follows: the next 
section provides the context of post-conflict 
Bougainville; the methodology for data collection 
is then presented; some preliminary findings are 
outlined; and the paper concludes with implications 
for policymaking.
The Context
Bougainville is a volcanic island with a land area 
of 8,990 square kilometres (equal to 2 per cent of 
the total land mass of Papua New Guinea) situated 
6 degrees south of the equator and to the east of 
mainland New Guinea (Figure 1). Until 1998, 
North Solomons Province comprised the mainland 
(of Bougainville Island) and the surrounding 
islands of Buka, Carterets, Nissan, Nuguria, and the 
outliers Mortlock and Tasman. It was one of the 
19 provinces of Papua New Guinea which, together 
with the National Capital District, comprised the 
nation state of Papua New Guinea. Bougainville 
acquired autonomy on domestic policies and 
policing as part of a peace agreement that was 
concluded in 2001 following the violent decade-
long intra-state war (GoPNG 2001).
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Figure 1: The Autonomous Region of 
Bougainville
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University
The conflict began with militants delivering a 
series of explosions from 25 to 27 November 1988. 
These explosions brought down several power 
pylons belonging to the Bougainville Copper 
Limited (BCL) gold and copper mine at Panguna 
in central Bougainville. BCL was then jointly 
owned by Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (with 
equity of 54 per cent), the Papua New Guinea 
Government (19 per cent) and through public 
shares (27 per cent) (Thompson 1991). The mine 
had been in production since April 1972 and to its 
closure in May 1989 had accounted for 45 per cent of 
national exports, 17 per cent of internally generated 
government revenues, and 12 per cent of GDP 
(Carruthers 1990). By 1986 BCL was in mid-life with 
a dozen years of proven recoverable reserves and 
annual exports of ore concentrate containing 178,600 
tons of copper and 16.4 tons of gold (World Bank 
1988). It was among the ten largest copper mines 
on the planet and poised for an investment program 
from 1988 to 1992 of 520 million kina (at 1988 
prices).2 The mine was classed as a low-cost producer 
and an ‘extremely successful venture’ (World Bank 
1988 vol. 2:16). BCL suspended operations in the 
aftermath of the explosions as security deteriorated 
and was forced to close the mine indefinitely 
on 15 May 1989 (Thompson 1991). The mine 
remains closed.
The population of the island at the beginning 
of the conflict is estimated at 175,900, constituting 
about five per cent of the then national population of 
four million (Thompson 1991).3 Internal migration 
within Bougainville up until the development of 
the mine was negligible. Thomson (1991:73), for 
example, notes that: ‘as recently as 1975, 95 per cent 
of the islanders were living within 10 kilometres 
of where they were born’. Importantly, pre-conflict 
Bougainville was a wealthy province with highly 
favourable socio-economic indicators in comparison 
to the rest of the nation. In 1983, per capita 
income at 1,973 kina was the second highest of 
the 20 provinces of Papua New Guina (Figure 2); 
surpassed only by the National Capital District (with 
per capita income of 2,115 kina) that is home to Port 
Moresby, the nation’s capital (World Bank 1988).4 
Bougainville ranked first among the provinces on 
life expectancy (59.6 years compared to the national 
average of 49.6 years), infant mortality (33 deaths per 
1,000 live births compared to the national average 
of 72), and second lowest in terms of the proportion 
of population without any schooling (50.1 per cent 
compared to the national average of 78.0 per cent) 
(World Bank 1988 vol. 1:98). Before its closure, BCL 
generated 196 megawatts of electricity at its thermal 
plant in Loloho (located a ten-minute drive on a 
sealed road from Arawa, the provincial capital), 
compared to total production in Port Moresby then 
of 90.5 megawatts (World Bank 1988 vol. 2:34).
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The North Solomons Province economy 
dominated those of the rest of the provinces. While 
accounting for less than five per cent of the total 
population of Papua New Guinea, North Solomons 
contributed 14 per cent of national income. BCL 
alone contributed nearly half of national exports. 
Thompson (1991:81) posits that an uninterrupted 
1989 would have resulted in BCL contributing 
30 per cent (430 million kina) of total exports, 
11 per cent (315 million kina) of total GDP, 4,000 
direct and another 8,000 indirect jobs, salary 
payments amounting to 52 million kina, and 
government revenues inclusive of employee tax 
payments of 184 million kina. North Solomons 
Province also led the provinces in terms of exports 
of cocoa and copra. There is little information 
on the sources of income for households other 
than the 1980 census that shows that 77 per cent 
of all rural households grew some cocoa and that 
cocoa and copra were the major sources of cash 
income for the bulk of the population. Within the 
mine-affected area, the average annual household 
receipt from cocoa growing was 807 kina; some 
40 per cent greater than the 500 kina compensation 
payments received by households living within the 
mining-lease area (Thompson 1991). Cocoa was 
exported from Bougainville throughout the crisis, 
albeit at diminished rates. All cocoa produced is 
exported, thus cocoa production is an excellent 
proxy for cash income receipts for most households 
in North Solomons Province. A total of 16,833 
households were engaged in producing cocoa in 
2010 (data provided by the Cocoa Board of Papua 
New Guinea).
The causes of the conflict on Bougainville are 
complex and many. Consequently, the coverage 
here is selective and succinct.5 There were disputes 
between BCL management and the communities 
living downstream, on the environmental impact 
of mine tailings;6 simmering differences within 
landowner groups over the distribution of 
compensation and land rents; and growing tensions 
among the various groups within Bougainville as 
well as those from outside on perceived inequities 
in income distribution and job opportunities from 
the mine (Thompson 1991). Many historians 
attribute the conflict to the difficulty of reconciling 
traditional expectations of reciprocity with 
payment of compensation and royalties; the shoddy 
nature of the work identifying stakeholders and 
landowners when the mine was first established; 
and the botched attempt by the police at resolving 
the conflict, following the first series of explosions 
(Ogan 1991; Regan 1998; Wesley-Smith 1991). 
Furthermore, there were demands for secession in 
the lead-up to independence (in 1975) of Papua 
Figure 2: Per capita income by province, Papua New Guinea, 1983
Source: World Bank (1988:36, 98)
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New Guinea from Australia (Ata 1998) and 
protests by the local landowners against the issuing 
of mining leases by the colonial administration for 
the 12,500 hectares to be used for the mine site, 
access roads and waste disposal (Hyndman 1991). 
Thomson (1991:69) claims that ‘economic causes 
are by far the most important’.
Initial attempts at resolving the conflict were 
botched, with ramifications for peace decades later. 
The national government saw the sabotage of BCL 
activity as criminal behaviour and responded by 
sending in its Police Riot Squad from the mainland 
to bring those responsible to the courts. The 
conflict turned violent when police used force to 
apprehend those thought responsible. Their failure 
to contain the situation led to the deployment 
of soldiers from the mainland, which escalated 
the violence further while creating a lasting rift 
between locals and security forces (Regan 1998). 
The police and soldiers employed the tactic of 
bringing communities into submission and in the 
process committed acts of ‘random human rights 
abuses (assaults, rapes, extra-judicial killings, 
and burning of villages)’ (Regan 1998:277). 
Misconduct among the police and members of the 
disciplinary forces was rife with ‘numerous reports 
of harassment and intimidation of Bougainvilleans’ 
(Wesley-Smith 1991:194). The fact that members 
of the disciplinary forces were from outside 
Bougainville brought an ethnic dimension to the 
conflict, solidifying resistance from the locals. 
Consequently, what started as a conflict between 
BCL and the communities surrounding the mine 
quickly escalated into an ethnic conflict, and one 
that later took on secessionist dimensions (May 
and Spriggs 1990). The entire province was drawn 
into a violent conflict between the islanders and 
(mostly) the mainlanders that commenced with the 
threshold level of 25 battle deaths on 28 October 
1989 and ended at the end of the 1996 calendar 
year (Gleditsch et al. 2002).7
The conflict worsened, dragging the economy 
with it following the imposition of an embargo on 
the supply of goods and services to the province 
by the national government in May 1990. The 
events leading to the embargo were the signing of a 
ceasefire agreement on 1 March and the universal 
declaration of independence by the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army (BRA) on 17 May. There were 
anti-BRA factions who cooperated with the Papua 
New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) during the 
crisis, but following the departure of the PNGDF 
the conflict quickly degenerated into localised 
fighting (Regan 2007). The BRA and its loose and 
often undisciplined factions turned against each 
other and those perceived to be sympathisers of the 
now-departed PNGDF. The fighting fractured the 
communities, leading to the formation of locally 
organised resistance groups (referred to as Home 
Guards), of which the Buka Liberation Front was 
among the first. Thus followed a multifaceted civil 
war within Bougainville (Regan 1999). The ensuing 
death and destruction led to a request by some 
communities for a return of the PNGDF to restore 
law and order.8 The PNGDF returned to parts of 
Bougainville, starting from Buka in late September 
1990. The embargo was lifted in September 1994 
following international pressure on the Papua New 
Guinea Government to allow supplies of food 
and medicine into the province after reports of a 
series of health problems surfacing in Bougainville 
(Wesley-Smith 1991:192). Regan (1999), however, 
notes that the embargo operated informally until 
1997, weighing heavily on exports of cocoa and 
copra from Bougainville and cutting off supplies of 
imports into the province. The ensuing hardships in 
accessing basic needs including medicines and cash 
deepened the resentment of the locals to the Papua 
New Guinea nation state. The civil war was brought 
to an end through a series of internationally med-
iated peace talks that finally bore fruit in mid-1997.
The ten-year conflict caused considerable 
devastation. While hard data on the levels of 
economic activity are absent, there is anecdotal 
evidence to suggest that incomes collapsed. 
Cocoa production, for example, fell steadily from 
12,903 tons of dry bean in 1988 to 2,619 tons in 
1996: on one calculation, just 12 per cent of the 
potential output. The latter, as shown in Figure 3, 
is calculated as the additional 5,747 tons of cocoa 
Bougainville on average produced annually to 
the decade to 1988 in comparison to East New 
Britain, the second-largest producer of cocoa in the 
country.9 On this comparison, cocoa production in 
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Bougainville had recovered to 48 per cent of the 
potential production by 2006. The comparison 
after 2006 is difficult due to the devastating impact 
of the cocoa pod borer, a pest that reached East 
New Britain in 2007 and had crossed over to 
northern Bougainville by 2009. The fall in cash 
income within Bougainville could have been larger 
still since the closure of the mine left many workers 
unemployed and businesses providing support 
services derelict. Cash flow ground to a trickle and 
basic needs including medicine and fuel were being 
smuggled in during the embargo. The blockade 
of Bougainville via the embargo was designed to 
deprive the BRA of imports and export income 
and it had the desired effect (Wesley-Smith 1991). 
The economic impact of the crisis varied across the 
region with south and central Bougainville hardest 
hit from the embargo while a trickle of cocoa 
continued to flow out of Buka.
Similarly, access to basic services deteriorated 
as roads, schools and hospitals were ‘cooked’ 
(burnt). Regan (1999:59) recalls that North 
Solomons Province ‘had the most effective 
provincial administration and local-level 
government systems in Papua New Guinea’. By 
December 1997 when truce was reached most 
of the infrastructure had been destroyed and 
the provincial government was left leaderless. In 
2011, charred remains of buildings and destroyed 
infrastructure confronted the author to what was 
once a thriving community. The cost of war in 
terms of lost lives, production, and opportunities 
for improved wellbeing of the residents remains 
to be assessed. A detailed count of battle deaths, 
a measure widely used to gauge the severity of 
fighting, is absent. However, estimates range 
from 1,000 to 20,000 deaths with another 60,000 
of a total population of 160,000 reported to be 
living in care centres (constituting internally 
displaced people) at the height of the crisis in 1996 
(Braithwaite et al. 2010). The conflict caused deep 
divisions both within Bougainville and between the 
people of Bougainville and the rest of Papua New 
Guinea, divisions that persist well after the war.
Several attempts were made to broker peace 
(Table 1). At least 10 peace agreements were 
negotiated between the warring parties before 
fighting was brought to an end. Community 
elders, civil society, traditional elders and women’s 
groups all contributed to the negotiation for 
Figure 3: Cocoa production in Bougainville and East New Britain provinces, 1978–2006
Note: The potential output of cocoa for Bougainville is created as the production from East New Britain 
plus 5,747 tons — the average difference in annual production from 1978 to 1988.
Source: Data from Cocoa Board of Papua New Guinea
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peace. A truce was reached between the parties in 
conflict in December 1997 through mediation by 
the government of New Zealand, and a ceasefire 
agreement was reached in April 1998. Peacekeepers 
from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga and 
Vanuatu monitored the ceasefire agreement from 
December 1997 to December 2003. Bougainville 
had its first elections for a new (autonomous) 
government in 2005, following which the 
observer mission from the United Nations left 
satisfied with the outcome. The autonomous 
region had its second election for parliament 
and the office of president in 2010. While a ‘no 
go zone’ surrounding Panguna mine in central 
Bougainville remains restricted to most visitors, 
peace has prevailed since July 1997. The economy 
is recovering. An assessment of the extent of this 
rebound is the subject of the next two sections.
The economy, using data on actual production 
vis-à-vis potential production of cocoa as depicted 
in Figure 3, hovered at less than 30 per cent of 
potential output between 1989 and 2002. Annual 
cocoa exports collapsed from 11,924 tons in 1989 
to 3,146 tons during the embargo — equal to 
13 per cent of potential exports. Annual cocoa 
exports bottomed out at 2,619 tons for the year 
to October 1996 — equal to 12 per cent of the 
potential production. There has been a slow pick-
up since half the potential output (vis-à-vis the 
pre-crisis output relative to the output of East New 
Britain) was reached in 2006. The collapse of the 
economy and its rebound mimics the chronology 
of the major attempts at reaching truce (Table 1). 
Data on income and levels of access to services are 
unavailable and were collected using a household-
level survey. Such data provide a more recent and 
granulated picture of the rebound in the economy 
in terms of access to basic services. Data collection 
in a post-conflict environment presents several 
challenges, which are explained below.
Data Collection Methodology
The logistics of conducting household surveys in an 
unstable post-conflict environment are demanding. 
Approval from the University of New South Wales 
Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel was first 
secured. While gaining the approval was in itself a 
challenge, the application process proved valuable 
Table 1: Chronology of truce attempts since the beginning of the conflict
Number Date Event
0 November–December 
1988
Explosives stolen from Panguna mine on 22 November. Power pylons supplying electricity to the 
mine blown using the explosives on 25 November. Police Riot Squad deployed from mainland in 
December. 
1 May 1989 Namaliu Peace Agreement between the Bougainville Revolutionary Army and PNG 
Government. (BCL closes operations on 15 May.)
2 October 1989 National government peace package, which is rejected by Francis Ona a month later
3 March 1990 Bougainville Ceasefire Initiative — international observers arrive on 13 March to monitor 
withdrawal of PNGDF and surrender of weapons, but withdraw three days later
4 August 1990 Endeavour Accord signed by the Bougainville Revolutionary Army and PNG Government
5 October 1990 Kavieng Agreement calling for the national government to restore law and order and services on 
Buka Island
6 January 1991 Honiara Declaration on restoration of services on Bougainville
7 October 1994 North Nasioi Peace Agreement 
8 July–October 1997 Burnham I involving talks between leaders within Bougainville (July) and Burnham II involving 
talks for peace between the national government and leaders from Bougainville
9 January 1998 Lincoln Agreement
10 April 1998 Arawa Ceasefire Agreement
11 August 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement
Sources: Australian Government (1999), Regan (1999)
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in planning for the survey.10 Security of the 
researchers in a post-conflict situation is of utmost 
concern. Then there are issues of winning trust of 
the community; being able to harness local capacity 
for conducting the surveys; obtaining information 
on the population to allow for appropriate sample 
selection; deciding on the variables on which to 
collect data; and being able to fund the survey. 
Each of the above is elaborated upon next.
Gaining Entry into the Community
Gaining entry into the community is crucial for 
containing security risks to the researchers and 
critical for maintaining the quality of the collected 
information. Partnerships were made with two 
research institutions: the National Research 
Institute (NRI) — a government-funded policy 
think-tank based in Port Moresby — and the open 
campus of the University of Papua New Guinea 
(UPNG) located in Buka, the post-conflict capital 
of Bougainville. The project recruited 27 students 
through UPNG and trained them in the conduct 
of the survey. The training was done three months 
ahead of the actual survey. Part of the training 
involved familiarisation with the objectives of the 
research, the use of a camera and a hand-held 
global positioning system (GPS) instrument, and 
the piloting of the questionnaire in the surrounding 
villages of Buka. The trained personnel were issued 
certificates as research assistants.11
The Autonomous Bougainville Government 
was invited by the NRI to partner in this research. 
The chief administrator opened the workshop for 
the trainees where he emphasised the need for 
socio-economic data for planning purposes. We 
did two radio interviews on the research explaining 
its objectives and announced that the collected 
information will be put in the public domain. 
Several trainees used their church and village 
networks to broadcast news of the impending 
survey. One of the research assistants was a 
paramount chief in her community, another two 
were former BRA commanders, and many more 
were devout Christians. Their networks and the 
three-month lead time lent the opportunity to 
broadcast the plans for the household survey.
In the week of the survey, village heads and 
community elders were approached for their 
permission to conduct the survey; the reasons 
for the research were explained and a promise 
given that the findings would be presented to 
the community later in the year.12 A similar 
meeting was held with the head of the Me’ekamui 
government. All of these meetings were cordial 
and a few of the discussions took place in Tok Pisin 
(Papua New Guinean pidgin), where the research 
assistants provided critical support. In the field, 
each member of the team wore a uniform in the 
form of a dark gold T-shirt (as advised by one 
research assistant) that had the NRI logo stamped 
on it and a cap displaying the logo of the University 
of New South Wales. Thus, every attempt was made 
to make the purpose of the survey and the identity 
of the surveyors as transparent as possible. This 
worked as households we subsequently visited knew 
of our presence and cooperated with the survey.
Drawing in Local Knowledge and Capacity
UPNG students proved critical to the conduct 
of the survey. The interviewers were trained in 
survey techniques and informed of the objectives 
of the exercise. They knew the context, spoke the 
language, and were familiar with the culture and 
the community. The community standing of the 
resident director of UPNG, who was also part of 
the research team, and his role in the recruitment of 
the interviewers, were critical to the success in the 
field. A project coordinator was recruited through 
the NRI who then managed the logistics of hiring 
the venue for training and for accommodation and 
payment of the researchers. The coordinator, being 
from Bougainville, also helped in providing access 
to the community.
Interviewers were sent in pairs. Each interview 
team was made up of a man and woman with at 
least one of them familiar with the local language 
and custom. The entire team of interviewers 
moved together in cohorts from one location to 
another, which helped with security and logistics of 
transport. They were paid a daily stipend and each 
pair was given a credit of five kina to allow for use 
on their mobile phones for communication while 
in the field.
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The entire research team was accommodated 
at a single guest house in each region visited. 
This permitted a daily debrief on the qualitative 
information gathered, the exchange of lessons 
from the day, the entry of the collected data 
into a database, and the audit of the collected 
information. It also provided time for bonding 
and sharing of the information with the locals who 
worked at the guesthouse.
Sampling
The last complete population census on 
Bougainville was conducted in 1980. The next 
census, conducted in 2000, missed the conflict 
zones in central Bougainville and, as we discovered 
during the survey, several other villages in south 
Bougainville. Villages had moved in the 31 years, 
making the 1980 census of little use in sample 
selection.13 Furthermore, people moved both 
during and since the conflict; thus information on 
the distribution of the population and locations 
of economic activity is largely absent. Given the 
challenges of logistics, we confined our fieldwork 
to the four main urban centres: Buka (north island-
Bougainville), Selau (north mainland Bougainville), 
Arawa (central mainland Bougainville) and Buin 
(south mainland Bougainville) (see Figure 1).
The survey boundaries were drawn prior to 
fieldwork. Google© (satellite) Maps provides a 
reasonably accurate picture of residences in the 
urban centres (Figure 4). This is not so for rural 
areas and particularly those in the highlands, which 
are often under thick cloud cover. Thus, urban 
centres were marked on maps for the survey and a 
hand-held GPS instrument was used to reconcile 
observations on the ground with the maps. A 
stratified random sampling approach was used 
where one household was chosen at random from 
every cluster of 10 counted when approached from 
one end of the town boundary. Permission was first 
sought from the head of the household to record 
the location and take a picture of their home. Only 
then were the GPS coordinates recorded and a 
picture of the residence taken. These spatial data 
permit audit of our sample selection, and provide 
the opportunity for future longitudinal analysis. 
A survey team then proceeded to administer 
the questionnaire. Two reserve households were 
preselected for every cluster of 10. In the survey 
of 181 households, seven households on the first 
reserve list were used and none on the second list 
had to be approached.
Data Collected
The questionnaire comprised five blocks, and was 
completed in approximately 30 minutes. The first 
block was devoted to questions on the physical 
location of the household; the second focused 
on the attributes of the household head and the 
size of the household; the third concentrated 
on the status of living conditions including the 
size, type of building material used, and age of 
the dwelling; the fourth asked questions on the 
level and sources of income; and the last asked 
for information on the level of education for each 
member of the household. Information on the age 
and type of building material used (i.e. modern, 
traditional, or a mixture of the two) and the level 
of education by birth year was collected to enable 
the creation of a time profile of access to education 
(and by extension other basic services) and the 
levels of construction activity by type of building 
materials used.
Source: Plotted using Google Maps© and GPS coordinates 
recorded (not shown) as part of the household survey 
conducted in February 2011
Figure 4: Survey boundary for Arawa
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Costs
Conducting fieldwork in post-conflict 
environments is expensive. Two four-wheel-drive 
vehicles were hired, each costing 1,000 kina per 
day. Poor road conditions and frequent flooding 
left these vehicles stranded on a few occasions. 
Travel between urban centres had to be done in 
convoys for safety of the passengers. Costs of basic 
accommodation were approximately 250 kina per 
day per person.
The cash contribution for this research was 
funded through a grant from the Australian Civil 
Military Centre, while the University of New South 
Wales provided one PhD scholarship and the 
salary costs of its staff on the research team. NRI 
lent space to hold meetings in Port Moresby, and 
spared office and administrative support for the 
project coordinator. UPNG hosted research and 
training activities in Buka. Finally, the Autonomous 
Bougainville Government, including President John 
Momis, provided personal public endorsement to 
the research project.
Some Preliminary Findings
Presented next are summary statistics in the form 
of a snapshot as of February 2011. Later, data is 
produced to reflect on the time profile of levels 
of access to services and investment. The latter is 
important given the absence of information on the 
conditions during the crisis.
Table 2 provides summary statistics on 
household characteristics for the 181 households 
that were interviewed during the survey. The 
second row from the top of the table shows that the 
average age of the household head was 45 years; the 
distribution of the age had a standard deviation of 
11; and the youngest household head was 20 years 
while the oldest was 81 years. The third row shows 
that 58 per cent of household heads were males 
— a significant finding given that three (Arawa, 
Buka and Selau) of the four sites surveyed have 
matrilineal systems of transmission of rights to land 
held under customary ownership. The fourth row 
shows that 30 per cent of the households moved 
residence due to conflict; this is in contrast to 
pre-conflict Bougainville when internal migration 
was minimal. There are on average six people per 
household with an equal division between males 
and females, with two in school and a similar 
number of dependents — defined as those being 
either less than 15 years or more than 65 years of 
age. Some 56 per cent of the residences are reported 
to be owned by the household head; the average 
age of the residence was 15 years; and the mean 
reported household weekly income was 416 kina. 
The implied annual per capita urban income is 
3,795 kina (at February 2011 prices and equal to 
769 kina at 1983 prices when Papua New Guinea’s 
GDP deflator is used) and equal to 39 per cent of 
the per capita income of North Solomons Province 
Table 2: Summary statistics on households surveyed
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum
Age of household head 181 45 11 20 81
Male household head 181 58% 0.49 0 1
Moved house due to conflict 179 30% 0.46 0 1
Number of people per house 181 5.70 3.03 1 16
Number of males per house 180 2.85 1.76 0 9
Number of dependents per house 179 1.78 1.70 0 8
Number in school per house 179 1.89 1.84 0 8
Proportion owning house 181 56% 0.50 0 1
Year house built 112 1996 13.77 1960 2011
Household weekly income (kina) 180 416 317 <100 >1,000 
Source: Based on data collected from 181 households surveyed in Arawa, Buin, Buka and Selau in February 2011
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as a whole in 1983. Three qualifications are in 
order here. First, the reported household income 
excludes the value of subsistence production or the 
imputed rents of owner-occupied housing. Second, 
determining ownership of a house was problematic 
in Arawa, a town built on alienated land. Many 
household heads could not produce title deeds, 
claiming that they were living on their traditional 
land.14 Third, our survey reveals the average per 
capita income for urban Bougainville, while the 
figure for 1983 is that for the whole province.
Data on the year of birth and the highest 
level of education attained was collected for 
each member of the households surveyed (1,014 
individuals). Table 3 provides the age distribution of 
all individuals captured in the survey. One of every 
three survey participants was less than 15 years 
of age and nearly one-half less than 20 years of 
age. The average age of the individuals captured 
via this survey is 25 years and the frequency 
distribution by age, as shown in Figure 5, is not 
typical. The difference between the fitted normal 
and Epanechnikov kernel density plots, shown as 
line graphs, are negative for those between the ages 
of 22 and 48 (i.e. born between 1963 and 1989) and 
positive for those aged less than 22 or more than 
48 years.15 This gap in terms of fewer people within 
the 22–48 year age bracket and greater numbers on 
either side of this age group than what would be 
‘normally’ expected could be due to a combination 
of sampling error, age-specific migration to urban 
centres, and greater mortality of children and young 
people during the conflict if birth rates remained 
stable over the past five decades.
Table 3: Population distribution by age cohort
Age group 
(years)
Females 
(number)
Males 
(number)
Per cent 
of total
Cumulative 
per cent
1–5 50 53 10.2 10.2
6–10 53 58 10.9 21.1
11–15 55 74 12.7 33.8
16–20 81 59 13.8 47.6
21–25 61 55 11.4 59.1
26–30 42 42 8.3 67.4
31–35 41 38 7.8 75.1
36–40 26 23 4.8 80.0
41–45 24 21 4.4 84.4
46–50 30 26 5.5 89.9
51+ 49 53 10.1 100.0
Source: Calculated from 1,014 individuals (502 males  
and 512 females) from the 181 households surveyed
Figure 5: Population distribution by age
Note: The normal (black) and Epanechnikov (blue) kernel density plots are shown as line graphs.
Source: Based on data collected from 181 households surveyed comprising 1,014 individuals  
in Arawa, Buin, Buka and Selau in February 2011
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A summary of access to basic services by 
the sites surveyed is given in Table 4. Household 
heads are youngest in Arawa. The majority of 
residences there have internal toilets — a fact due 
to these houses being constructed by BCL. Access 
to electricity, banking services and telephones are 
best in Buka and worst in Buin. Only half of the 
40 households surveyed in Buin, for example, had 
bank accounts and just one had a television. Thus, 
access to services differs considerably across the 
four survey sites.
A time profile of the level of access to 
education can be inferred by examining the highest 
level of schooling achieved by year of birth in the 
sample. Table 5 shows the proportion of individuals 
who reported as having not attended school at all 
depending whether they were of school age before 
(i.e. were at least six years of age in 1989 when 
the conflict erupted), during (birth years 1983 
to 1991), or after the conflict (birth year 1992 to 
2005). The data shows that 2 per cent of those of 
school age before, and a similar percentage for 
those of school age during, the crisis missed out 
on schooling altogether. However, 13 per cent of 
the school-aged population were not in school in 
the post-conflict era. Furthermore, 35 per cent of 
those between 6 and 10 years of age were not in 
school as of February 2011. The full distribution 
of the highest year of schooling by age is shown in 
Figure 6. The main drop-off years from school (and 
their respective probabilities in parentheses) are: 
Year 6 (20 per cent if enrolled in primary school), 
Year 10 (28 per cent if survived Year 6), and Year 12 
(33 per cent if survived Year 10). On the basis of 
these figures, the probability of a six-year-old ready 
to enter school in Arawa completing secondary 
school by age 18 is 11 per cent. That is, one in nine 
children that enter Grade 1 does not make it to 
Year 12.
Similarly, data on the date of construction of the 
residence, its floor space, and type of material used 
for construction was collected from the households 
surveyed. Figure 7 shows a time plot for Buka 
and Selau, the two survey sites with significant 
variation in this data, of the number of houses 
constructed using modern materials such as sawn 
timber, roofing iron and concrete. Construction in 
Buka picked up from 1995 to 2000 and then again 
from 2005 to 2010. These dates coincide with the 
episodes of peace. On the first, Regan (1999:43) 
notes that: ‘Buka enjoyed relative normalcy from 
the early 1990s, and has been the main economic 
centre ever since’ due to the early return of the 
PNGDF. The lack of similar activity in Arawa 
could be due to the lack of titles to the properties 
while the security situation in south Bougainville 
remains volatile. The media, for example, reported 
of fighting between resistance groups leading to 
fatalities in August 2011.16
Table 4: Access to basic services by urban centre surveyed
Arawa Buin Buka Selau Total
Number of households surveyed 74 40 33 34 181
Average age of household head 43 47 45 46 45
Average number of people in the household 6 5 6 6 6
Proportion of households with access to electricity (%) 51 40 76 62 55
Proportion of households with an internal toilet (%) 93 18 42 9 51
Proportion of households with a television (%) 45 3 61 35 36
Proportion of households with a telephone (%) 88 90 97 76 88
Proportion of households having a bank account (%) 73 50 85 62 68
Average household weekly income at 2011 prices (kina/week) 486 328 427 355 416
Source: Based on data collected from 181 households surveyed in Arawa, Buin, Buka and Selau in February 2011
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How much of the results reported above can 
be generalised? This is a question of external 
validity. The answer is that the findings here can 
be generalised only to urban Bougainville and 
thus hold true for less than 20 per cent of the total 
population.17 The population of urban Bougainville 
comprises those who were moved to care centres 
at the height of the crisis and/or those able to 
make such a shift while basic services retracted 
from remote locations to the urban centres, 
and particularly to Arawa and Buka. Thus the 
composition of the urban population and the level 
of access to basic services are likely to be different 
to that of rural regions. Nonetheless, the direction 
of bias in terms of income levels and access to basic 
services and age distribution of the population 
between urban and rural regions is well known. 
That is, levels of access to basic services in rural 
areas are poorer while the population there is on 
average, according to data from the (selective) 
‘population census’ of 2000, younger. Thus these 
results have value in terms of informing policies 
and planning strategies of the national government 
and the government of the Autonomous Region of 
Bougainville.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
Socio-economic indicators in Bougainville are 
rebounding. That is, access to services and income 
has improved since the cessation in 1997 of the 
decade-long violent conflict. This paper has 
provided the first glimpse of the extent of recovery 
following the installation of peace. I have drawn 
on data on aggregate cocoa exports from 1978 to 
2006 to paint a time profile of the macro economy 
of Bougainville. Missing from the above is mining 
output, which collapsed in 1989. I complement 
the macro-economic picture with household-level 
survey data collected in February 2011 to illustrate 
Table 5: Survey participants with zero years of 
schooling by birth year
Birth year Females 
(number)
Males 
(number)
Proportion 
without 
schooling 
(%) 
1982 or earlier 6 0 2
1983 to 1991 2 2 2 
1992 to 2005 12 33 13
Source: Based on data collected from 911 individuals born 
 in or before 2005 from the 181 households surveyed
Figure 6: Frequency distribution for years of schooling for those aged 
20 years and above
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SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm14                                                                                                                           State, Society & Govern ce in Melanesia
Satish Chand
the socio-economic conditions of the population. 
The data are used to re-create information on 
conditions for investment and levels of access to 
basic services during the conflict.
The use of age and the highest level of 
schooling attained provide a means to reconstruct a 
time profile on the level of access to basic services. 
Similarly, data on the age of residences and types 
of building materials used for construction provide 
information on the conditions for investment. 
The latter also provides information on the 
perception of the population on peace prevailing 
into the future. In particular, the recent growth 
in construction of modern structures signals that 
investors have confidence in peace prevailing 
over the life of the building. It could also provide 
evidence on improvements in access to income and 
credit. Building materials other than sawn timber 
are imported and thus require cash. Similarly, the 
growth of modern structures in each of the four 
centres surveyed as captured by the pictures taken 
of residences suggests that the owners are confident 
that these structures will not be ‘cooked’ in future.
There are several lessons for policymakers from 
the data collected in this survey. First, internal 
migration spiked during the conflict, implying 
Figure 7: Construction of modern houses in Buka and Selau
Source: Based on data collected from 67 households surveyed from two urban centres in Bougainville
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that restoring damaged infrastructure for delivery 
of basic services may not be the most appropriate 
means to improving access to basic services. 
Second, the movement of people raises question 
of rights to land the settlers have since occupied. 
This places priority to resolving disputes on rights 
to land settled on since the commencement of the 
conflict. And third, the large young population 
places urgency on the supply of public goods 
and job creation for the foreseeable future. The 
latter demands improved conditions for private 
enterprise so as to provide income and employment 
opportunities for the youth who will be entering the 
workforce for decades to come.
The logistics of conducting a household survey 
in a post-conflict environment are demanding, 
but careful planning and sufficient resources can 
allow for data collection in difficult environments. 
Critical to the progress made with data collection 
for this paper were: (i) employment and training of 
local researchers; (ii) publicity on the purpose of 
the household survey; and (iii) partnership with the 
community and the households who volunteered 
the information. Obtaining human research ethics 
approval, while a painstakingly demanding exercise, 
is helpful in the planning of the survey itself. One 
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important lesson from this work is that honesty 
and transparency (with some modesty on what a 
household survey can deliver) can go a long way 
to winning the confidence and support of the 
surveyed population.
How does a bounce back in the economy 
affect the sustainability of peace in Bougainville? 
Reassuringly, there is a body of research showing 
a strong negative relationship between the health 
of an economy and the incidence of conflict. Thus 
policies targeted at raising income and improving 
access to basic services can be critical backstops to 
conflict recidivism in Bougainville.
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Endnotes
1 I am grateful to the Australian Civil Military 
Centre and the University of New South Wales for 
funding this research, to the National Research 
Institute and the University of Papua New Guinea 
(UPNG) for their assistance in conducting fieldwork 
in Bougainville, to the 28 research assistants 
from UPNG for administering the survey, to the 
181 households who participated in the survey, and 
to two knowledgeable anonymous reviewers for their 
helpful and encouraging comments. Naturally, I am 
responsible for any errors in the paper.
2 At 31 March 1988, one kina was worth US$1.33 
(World Bank 1988:iii).
3 The population of North Solomons Province as of 
the 1980 census was 125,506. Assuming an annual 
growth rate of 3.4 per cent as reported by the World 
Bank (1988:107), the population in 1988 would have 
been around 164,000.
4 This average figure masks the large variation in 
income within the provinces.
5 See Braithwaite et al. (2010) and Regan (2010) on the 
causes of the conflict and the negotiations to peace.
6 The two rivers most affected by the mining were 
Jaba and Kawerong (which both drain into Empress 
Augusta Bay), as reported in a PNG Government–
commissioned report and quoted extensively in 
Thompson (1991).
7 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program defines an armed 
conflict as ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force between two parties, of which at least one is 
the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-
related deaths in one calendar year’. See <http://www.
pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/>.
8 The Chiefs of Buka published a letter in the Post-
Courier of 24 September 1990 requesting a return of 
the PNGDF.
9 The qualitative conclusions are unaffected if the 
counterfactual level of production for Bougainville is 
inflated by a factor of 1.69, the average for 1978–88, of 
the cocoa output for East New Britain.
10 The approval was granted on 2 September 2010; 
reference number A-10-40.
11 One of the trainees has since secured a job with 
a private company to conduct surveys in another 
province.
12 We were informed by one household head that the 
promised gift from an earlier survey was yet to arrive.
13 One reviewer of an earlier draft of this paper pointed 
out that the locations of villages are ‘still defined partly 
according to colonial divisions that in some cases are 
70 years out of date’.
14 It was decided not to push a clear response on this 
issue given its political sensitivity and the centrality of 
the dispute on rights to land in the conflict.
15 For those aged between 22 and 48 years as of 2011, the 
difference between the sexes was not significant.
16 The Post-Courier (online) reported on 19 August 2011 
that: ‘Yes, there are killings, there are guns still being 
used and innocent lives terrorised, women, children 
and youths affected and most importantly the service 
delivery mechanism is not effective in the area 
because of the infighting.’
17 According to the 1980 PNG population census, the 
urban population for North Solomons was 15.8 per 
cent of the total. This figure would have increased due 
to rural-to-urban migration since 1980.
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